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Using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, this paper shows that ￿nancial markets value ￿scal
discipline. Interest rates, particularly those of long-term government bonds, decrease when countries￿ ￿scal
position improves and increase around periods of budget deteriorations. Stock market prices surge around
times of substantial ￿scal tightening and plunge in periods of very loose ￿scal policy. In addition, the paper
shows that results depend on countries￿ initial ￿scal conditions and on the type of ￿scal consolidations. Fis-
cal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of government de￿cit, that are implemented by
cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are
associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices.
Keywords: Fiscal stabilizations, ￿scal expansions, interest rates, stock market prices.
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JEL classification: E62, E44, H62.Non-technical summary 
  
This paper investigates empirically the behavior of government and corporate 
bonds interest rates, of the LIBOR, and of stock market prices in times of large changes 
in the fiscal stance. In the last forty years, periods of large fiscal expansions alternated 
with years of sharp fiscal contractions in all OECD countries. These episodes have been 
associated with a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and have attracted the interest of 
macroeconomists since the early nineties. Several papers have studied the response of 
private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth to substantial changes in the 
government budget. Instead, the reaction of financial markets around episodes of large 
fiscal contractions and expansions has been overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to 
shed more light on the effect of fiscal policy on financial variables.  
  The methodology follows an empirical approach similar to the one used by Chari 
and Henry (2002) and by Henry (2000) and (2002) to study the effect of financial 
liberalization and disinflation programs on stock markets. The paper identifies periods of 
large fiscal contractions and expansions in a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002 
and focuses on changes in interest rates and stock market prices from before to after the 
periods of large changes in fiscal policy.  
  The paper begins by investigating the relation between interest rates, stock market 
data and the stance of fiscal policy by regressing the nominal and the real 10-year 
government bonds interest rate, the nominal and the real 3-month Treasury bills interest 
rate, the discount rate, the LIBOR, the corporate bonds’ interest rate, the log of the MSCI 
share price index, and the MSCI share price index growth rate on a set of dummy 
variables capturing the time distance from the episodes of fiscal contractions or fiscal 
expansions.  
  Results suggest that the cost of financing the government debt and the borrowing 
costs for consumers and firms are sensitive to the stance of fiscal policy. Sharp changes 
in the government primary balance-to-GDP ratio have the largest and most significant 
impact on long-term interest rates of government bonds. Interest rates of 10-year 
government bonds decrease, on average, by 124 basis points around episodes of fiscal 
consolidations and increase by 162 basis points during periods of loose fiscal policy. 
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and interest rates, the LIBOR and an average of the corporate bond interest rate. Stock 
market prices increase when countries’ fiscal position improves and decrease during 
periods of budget deteriorations. In summary, financial markets seem to welcome fiscal 
contractions and to punish governments that implement lax fiscal policies. Moreover, the 
effects seem to be anticipated and to persist over time.  
  The paper, then, extends the analysis to account for countries’ initial fiscal 
conditions, characteristics of fiscal consolidations and expansions, macroeconomic 
conditions, other economic policies, and future fiscal policy conditions by using a 
reparametrized version of the general models. There is evidence that the effects of fiscal 
consolidations depend on countries’ initial fiscal position and on the nature of fiscal 
contractions. Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of 
government deficit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that 
generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with 
larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices. Around periods of 
fiscal expansions, instead, the interest rates of 10-year government bonds and of 
corporate bonds increase and stock market prices decrease regardless of countries’ initial 
fiscal conditions. Finally, the conclusions hold to controlling for monetary policy, 
financial liberalization reforms and the degree of international integration of capital 
markets. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature along several lines. First, it 
documents the behavior of financial markets around episodes of large changes in the 
fiscal stance. Second, it provides more evidence on the impact of fiscal policy shocks on 
interest rates. Finally, it helps explaining why some fiscal consolidations (expansions) 
have been associated with economic booms (recessions) even in the very short-run, while 
others have not. Conclusions support two non-mutually exclusive views that have been 
proposed in the literature. One highlights the role played by the composition of fiscal 
adjustments and contractions. The other suggests that agents’ perception about the impact 
of current fiscal policy on the future path of government debt is important to explain the 
effect of large changes in the fiscal stance on the macroeconomy. 
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This paper investigates empirically the behavior of government and corporate bonds interest rates, of the
LIBOR, and of stock market prices in times of large changes in the ￿scal stance. In the last forty years,
periods of large ￿scal expansions alternated with years of sharp ￿scal contractions in all OECD countries.
Theseepisodeshavebeenassociatedwithavarietyofmacroeconomicoutcomesandhaveattractedtheinterest
of macroeconomists since the early nineties. Several papers have studied the response of private consumption,
private investment, and GDP growth to substantial changes in the government budget. Instead, the reaction of
￿nancial markets around episodes of large ￿scal contractions and expansions has been overlooked.1
The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the effect of ￿scal policy on ￿nancial variables. In
particular, the paper asks several questions: (i) do increases/decreases of the budget de￿cit affect ￿nancial
markets in opposite way? (ii) do countries￿ initial levels of government de￿cit and public debt matter for
the reaction of ￿nancial markets to ￿scal shocks? (iii) do ￿nancial markets care about which items of the
government budget change? (iv) what role do macroeconomic conditions and other economic policies play?
(v) do ￿nancial markets react in anticipation of more/less favorable ￿scal conditions in the future?
To answer these questions, the paper follows an empirical approach similar to the one used by Chari and
Henry (2002) and by Henry (2000) and (2002) to study the effect of ￿nancial liberalization and disin￿ation
programs on stock markets. The paper identi￿es periods of large ￿scal contractions and expansions in a panel
of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002 and focuses on changes in interest rates and stock market prices from
before to after the periods of large changes in ￿scal policy. Results suggest that ￿nancial markets value ￿scal
discipline. Sharp changes in the stance of ￿scal policy have the largest and most signi￿c a n ti m p a c to nl o n g -
1See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna (2004), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Gi-
avazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000), and McDermot and Wescott (1996) for contributions on large ￿scal contractions and expansions
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by 124 basis points around episodes of ￿scal consolidations and increase by 162 basis points during periods
of loose ￿scal policy. Fiscal consolidations and expansions also affect interest rates of 3-months Treasury
bills and interest rates measuring borrowing costs for consumers and ￿rms, but results are less robust to
speci￿cations￿ changes. Stock market prices increase when countries￿ ￿scal position improves and decrease
during periods of budget deteriorations.
There is also evidence that the effects of ￿scal consolidations depend on countries￿ initial ￿scal position
and on the nature of ￿scal contractions. Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of
government de￿cit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and
substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases
in stock market prices. Around periods of ￿scal expansions, instead, the interest rates of 10-year government
bonds and of corporate bonds increase and stock market prices decrease regardless of countries￿ initial ￿scal
conditions.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature goes beyond documenting the behavior of￿nancial
markets around episodes of large changes in the ￿scal stance. First, the paper provides more evidence on
the impact of ￿scal policy shocks on interest rates. For many years, the literature has reached inconclusive
evidence.2 Recently, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Engen and Hubbard (2004), and Laubach (2003)
￿nd that interest rates of government bonds increase (decrease) in response to expansionary (contractionary)
￿scal shocks in the US. Tavares and Valkanov (2003) show that increases in tax receipts lead to a decrease in
stock returns as well as government bond and corporate bond returns, while increases in government spending
have a positive but not statistically signi￿cant impact on all returns. Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) ￿nd
2See, for example, Barro (1987), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), Blanchard and Summers (1984), Evans (1985) and (1987),
Hoelscher (1986), Miller and Russek (1991) and (1996), Orr et al. (1995), Plosser (1987), and Reinhart and Sack (2000). See, also,
Bernoth et al. (2003), and Codogno et al. (2003) for contributions on the determinants of yield differentials in EU countries, and
Barth et al. (1991) and Gale and Orszag (2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
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interest rates to ￿scal shocks is nonlinear. Because ￿nancial markets￿ reaction to large ￿scal consolidations
and expansions is likely to be particularly sizeable, this paper can more easily disentangle the effect of ￿scal
shocks on interest rates by concentrating only on episodes of large changes in the stance of ￿scal policy.
Second, this paper focus not only on interest rates of governments￿ bonds, (as most of the contributions
in the literature), but also on interest rates charged to consumers and ￿rms and on stock market prices. Finally,
this paper helps explaining why some ￿scal consolidations (expansions) have been associated with economic
booms (recessions) even in the very short-run, while others have not. In fact, there are several channels
through which ￿scal shocks can be transmitted to the macroeconomy via ￿nancial markets. A part from the
effect of ￿scal policy on interest rates in a standard IS-LM model, agents￿ perception of the impact of current
￿scal policy on the future path of government debt can be important. If, for example, market participants
believe that a ￿scal stabilization permanently reduces the stock of public debt and, hence, avoids a default
on government bonds, they can ask for a lower risk premium and interest rates decline. This can lead to an
increase of private demand components sensitive to interest rates and to an economic boom.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and describes the methodology
used to identify episodes of ￿scal contractions and ￿scal expansions. Section 3 investigates the relation be-
tween large ￿scal contractions and expansions, interest rates and stock market prices and discusses the results.
Section4 extendstheanalysis of the benchmarkmodelstoaccount forcountries￿initial￿scal conditions, char-
acteristics of ￿scal consolidations and expansions, macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and
future ￿scal policy conditions. The last section concludes.
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2.1 Data
The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The coun-
tries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All
￿scal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 73, June 2003. Data on ￿nancial
variables are from various sources. Interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills, of 10-year government bonds and
of corporate bonds and data on LIBOR are from Global Financial Data. Data on the discount rate are from
the International Financial Statistics database, while stock market data are from Morgan Stanley. Finally, data
on indicators of international integration of capital markets have been provided by Milesi-Ferretti and data on
￿nancial development are from the World Bank database on Financial Development and Structure.3
2.2 Methodological issues
This section addresses the following issues: the use of yearly data rather than of high frequency data; the
choice of studying the behavior of ￿nancial variables around episodes of sharp changes in the ￿scal stance
rather than at the time of the announcements of the policy changes; the strategy used to identify such episodes.
In a rational world with no information asymmetries and credibility problems, ￿nancial markets should
react when new information is released. One should observe movements of ￿nancial variables when gov-
ernments announce ￿scal stabilizations or ￿scal expansions, not when they implement the policy changes if
the latter had been expected. Ideally, one would like to have information on the exact announcement date
and study the reaction of ￿nancial variables using high frequency data as, for example, Afonso and Strauch
(2003) and Knot and de Haan (1999) do. But information on announcements of sharp ￿scal policy changes
3The database is available on line at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/￿nstructure/database.htm.
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￿scal variables are available only at a yearly frequency for such a large panel. Hence, a feasible alternative
is to study the response of ￿nancial variables to the occurrence of ￿scal contractions and ￿scal expansions
using yearly data, but including in the sample observations from a few years before to a few years after the
occurrence of the large decrease/increase in the government budget.
The advantage of this approach is that one lets the data detect the time of the shock and allows for the
possibility that ￿nancial markets anticipate the policy change and/or react to changes in the ￿scal stance over
time as more information becomes available. The drawback is that the connection between sharp changes
in the ￿scal stance and ￿nancial variables becomes weaker the further away from the episodes, due to the
existence of other factors in different time periods. As a compromise, this paper concentrates on a window
from two years before to two years after the occurrence of a ￿scal contraction or expansion.4 Section 4.6
shows that results are robust to changing the length of the window.
Finally, what is the method used to identify episodes of ￿scal contractions and expansions? First, I select
episodes on the basis of large changes of the cyclically adjusted primary de￿cit-to-GDP ratio. This leaves
aside variations of the ￿scal variables induced by business cycle ￿uctuations or by changes in interest rates.
Hence, it prevents that the episodes selected result from economic growth or from monetary policy, rather
than from discretionary policy choices of ￿scal authorities.5 Second, in the benchmark speci￿cations, I use
the same criteria as in Alesina and Perotti (1997), and Ardagna (2004). Speci￿cally, an episode of large ￿scal
contraction (expansion) is a period in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at
least1.5 percentof GDPora period of two consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance
improves (worsens) by at least 1 per cent of GDP per year, in both years. This de￿nition selects 92 years of
4In the case of multi-years periods of ￿scal contractions or ￿scal expansions, the samples include data from two years before the
￿rst year of the episode of a ￿s c a lc o n t r a c t i o no re x p a n s i o nt ot w oy e ars after the last year of the episode.
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majority of the episodes are well known in the literature and, more importantly, several alternative de￿nitions
of ￿scal episodes select them. The inclusion of other periods in the samples, instead, depends on the rule
used to identify periods of ￿scal contractions or expansions. Hence, it is important to check that results do
not hinge on the use of the particular rule above. This is done in Section 4.6.
2.3 Descriptive ￿ndings
Figure 1 reorganizes the information in Table A1 and shows the distribution of ￿scal contractions and ￿scal
expansions across the countries in the sample and over time. All countries experience at least one year of
substantial improvement and worsening of the cyclically adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio. The highest
percentage of ￿scal contractions and ￿scal expansions happen in Sweden, where ￿scal policy has been sub-
stantially tight and lax in 10 and 11 years respectively. Italy and the UK are also among the countries that
experienced more swings in ￿scal policy, while Japan is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of ￿scal con-
tractions and ￿scal expansions. Overall, nine countries belong to the same quartile of the distribution of ￿scal
contractions and ￿scal expansions, while only one country, Ireland, shows a substantial higher propensity
to implement ￿scal contractions than ￿scal expansions. During the ￿rst ten years of the sample we observe
relatively little action in terms of sharp changes in the ￿scal stance. Episodes of ￿scal expansions dominate
the seventies. Periods of ￿scal contractions are relatively more frequent in the eighties and nineties. In the
most recent years, the stance of ￿scal policy has turned into expansionary again.6
Figure 2 shows the average value of interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills, of 10-year government
bonds and of corporate bonds, and the average value of the discount rate and LIBOR across episodes of ￿scal
contractions and ￿scal expansions. Figure 3 focus on the stock market. The x-axis plots time relative to the
6Note that the trends in Figure 1 re￿ect changes in the discretionary part of ￿scal policy. In fact, the change in the primary
balance-to-GDP ratio has been cyclically adjusted.
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stance occur. Average values of ￿nancial variables are shown from time T − 3 (three years before the ￿scal
contraction/expansion period) to T + 3 (three years after). Summary statistics of ￿nancial variables are also
shown in Table A2 of the appendix.
The top left part of Figure 2 shows that the pattern of the 10-year government bonds interest rate around
t h et i m eo f￿scal contractions is opposite to the one around periods of ￿scal expansions. From T −3t oT −2,
interest rates are increasing in both cases. From T − 2t i l lT + 2, instead, the 10-year government bonds
interest rate decreases by 111 basis points in episodes of ￿scal contractions and increases by 185 basis points
in ￿scal expansions. In T +2, the interest rate is higher in ￿scal expansions than in ￿scal contractions (8.89%
versus 10.55%) even if in T − 2 the situation was reversed (10% versus 8.70%).
The 3-month Treasury bills interest rate shows a similar pattern. Even though during episodes of ￿scal
expansions the increase in the rate is not continuous over time, from T − 2t oT + 2 we observe an increase
of 188 basis points against a decrease of 86 basis points in ￿scal contractions.
Next, ￿gure 2 plots the average value of the discount rate. Interestingly, following a sharp increase from
T −3toT −2in￿scal expansions, the discount rate is almost identical in the two types of episodes. Moreover,
its level and dynamics show less clear differences across ￿scal episodes than the 10-year government bonds
and the 3-month Treasury bills interest rates do.
The last two charts of Figure 2 plot the LIBOR and the average interest rate of corporate bonds. The
LIBOR and the corporate bonds interest rate decrease from T −2t oT +2 by 167 and 56 basis points respec-
tively during episodes of ￿scal contractions and increase by 153 and 185 basis points in ￿scal expansions. A
more careful look at the charts also reveals that the interest rate of corporate bonds follows more closely the
dynamics of the 10-year government bonds interest rates (even though period by period changes are smaller).
The pattern of the LIBOR, instead, re￿ects more the one of the discount rate, especially in ￿scal expansions
from T − 1t oT + 1.
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in US $ and in logs) and its growth rate. While share prices sharply increase as a ￿scal adjustment approaches,
they plunge in the proximity of a ￿scal expansion. For example, from T − 2t oT + 2t h el o go ft h eM S C I
share price index increases by 6.02 per cent when ￿scal policy is tight and decreases by 6.36 per cent when it
is lax. The rate of growth of the index is always positive and higher than the one in T − 2( e q u a lt o4 . 7 1 % )
during ￿scal contractions, but it is negative (except in T +1) and substantially lower than the 13.39% growth
rate in T − 2d u r i n g￿scal expansions.
In summary, a ￿rst look at the data suggests that the cost of ￿nancing the government debt and the
borrowing costs for consumers and ￿rms are sensitive to the stance of ￿scal policy. Financial markets seem
to welcome ￿scal contractions and to punish governments that implement lax ￿scal policies. Moreover, the
effects seem to be anticipated and to persist over time. However, by simply looking at the charts, it is not
possible to rule out other interpretations.
One alternative story could be that the sharp differences in the pattern of interest rates around ￿scal
episodes simply re￿ect differences in the stance of monetary policy if the latter is systematically lax around
periods of ￿scal adjustments and tight around episodes of ￿scal expansions. Looking at the patterns of the
3-month Treasury bills interest rate and of the LIBOR one might be tempted to believe that this story is
plausible. However, the dynamics of the discount rate seems to discourage this interpretation. Moreover, the
evidence that the 10-year government bonds interest rate and the corporate bonds interest rate continuously
decline/increase over time (and do not re￿ect swings as the short-term rates do) seems to suggest that large
changes in ￿scal policy can at least affect long-term interest rates.
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3.1 Basic speci￿cations
I begin by investigating the relation between interest rates, stock market data and the stance of ￿scal policy
by regressing the nominal and the real 10-year government bonds interest rate (INT10Y and RINT10Y,
respectively), the nominal and the real 3-month Treasury bills interest rate (INT3M and RINT3M, respec-
tively),7 the discount rate (DISCR), the LIBOR (LIBOR), the corporate bonds￿ interest rate (CORP), the
log of the MSCI share price index (MSCI), and the MSCI share price index growth rate (MSCIGR)o nas e t
of dummy variables capturing the time distance from the episodes of ￿scal contractions or ￿scal expansions.
Speci￿cally, I estimate:
Financialijt = αi + β1TIME ijT−1 + β2TIME ijT + β3TIME ijT+1 + β4TIME ijT+2 + εijt (1)
where Financial is one of the variables above, TIME T−j are four dummy variables equal to 1 when j =
−1,0,1,2 respectively and zero otherwise, αi captures country ￿xed effects, i indicates the countries in the
sample, t the annual observation, and j the episode of ￿scal contraction or expansion. For each episode, the
samples include observations from two years before to two years after the ￿scal contraction or expansion;
hence t ∈ [T − 2,T + 2]. In equation (1), the coef￿cients β1,β2,β3,β4 measure the change of the left-
7One would like to measure RINT10Y as the difference between the 10-year nominal interest rate and expectations of in￿ation
over the next ten years. In￿ation￿s forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for the panel of countries used here.
I follow Orr et al. (1995) and compute trend in￿ation using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. I apply the ￿lter to each country￿s in￿ation
rate using quarterly data and a value of λ equal to 1600. I, then, take the average over each year of the trend in￿ation generated with
quarterly data and calculate the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of trend in￿ation to the
nominal interest rate. I also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the difference between the nominal
interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post in￿ation rate. I, then, average over the year the quarterly data.
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Column 1 of Table 1 shows estimates of the equation for the nominal interest rate of 10-year government
bonds. The coef￿cients of the dummy variables TIME T−j are all negative in the sample of ￿scal contractions
and positive in the sample of ￿scal expansions. The 10-year government bonds interest rate decreases in each
period relatively to its value in T − 2 around times of tight ￿scal policy and it increases when governments￿
￿scal position worsens. The change of the intere s tr a t eg e t sl a r g e ra st i m eg o e sb ya n d ,w h i l eβ1 and β2 are not
statistically signi￿cant, β3 and β4 are statistically signi￿cant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. INT10Y
falls by 124 basis points in ￿scal contractions and raises by 162 basis points in ￿scal expansions.
Evidence along the same line is in column 2, where the left-hand side variable is the 3-month Treasury
bills nominal interest rate. The latter varies by 103 basis points in ￿scal stabilizations and by 158 basis points
in ￿scal expansions from T − 2t oT + 2. However, at no time horizon the fall in INT3M is statistically
signi￿cant in the sample of ￿scal adjustments, while only β4 is statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level during
episodes of ￿scal expansions. When we look at the real interest rates of the 10-year government bonds and
of the 3-month Treasury bills, the picture is very similar. However, the coef￿cients of the dummy variable
TIME ijT+2 in columns (3) and (4) are smaller, in absolute value, than in columns (1) and (2). This implies
that the cumulative changes from T − 2t oT + 2o fRINT10Y and RINT3M are smaller than those of
INT10Y and INT3M.
Lets￿ now turn to results in columns 5-7. The coef￿cients β1,β2,β3,β4 are never statistically signi￿cant
when equation (1)is estimated for the discount rate (column 5). Moreover, datado not showa clear decreasing
orincreasingpatternasinthecaseofinterestratesonpublicdebt, especiallyinthesampleof￿scalexpansions.
Table 1, instead, shows that either the LIBORor the average interest rate of corporate bonds are signi￿cantly
different (at least at the 10% level) at T, T + 1a n dT + 2 from their values at T − 2 either in the sample
8As part of the sensitivity analysis, I also estimate the benchmark speci￿cations in Tables 1 and 2 relaxing the assumption that
εijt is iid and allowing the error term to be correlated within countries or years. Results are robust.
hand side variable relatively to its mean at T − 2. I estimate (1) by OLS and correct the standard errors for
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￿scal policy shocks in￿uence private agents￿ decisions via ￿nancial markets by affecting not only the cost of
public debt but also interest rates charged to ￿rms and consumers.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 investigate the behavior of stock markets. The evidence is
consistent with the one for interest rates. The MSCI share price index and its growth rate increase around
episodes of ￿scal contractions and fall around periods of ￿scal expansions. For example, in times of ￿scal
expansions, the average growth rate of the MSCI share price index is 12.6% at T −2, and it decreases by about
16%, 18%, 10% and 14% in T − 1, T, T + 1a n dT + 2. Note, however, that the coef￿cients β1,β2,β3,β4
are statistically signi￿cant in the speci￿cation for the MSCI share price index only in the sample of ￿scal
contractions. In ￿scal expansions, β1,β2,β3,β4 are signi￿cant only for the speci￿cation for the growth rate
of the share price index.
3.2 A reparametrization of the basic speci￿cations
The absolute values of the coef￿cients of the dummy variables TIME T−j seem to decrease or increase
continuously from T −2t oT +2 for the regressions ofall ￿nancial variables for which we observe statistically
signi￿cant coef￿cients. To better capture this evidence, Table 2estimates a reparametrized version of equation
(1):
Financialijt = αi + γ FISCALijt + εijt (2)
where FISCALis equal to 1 two years before a ￿scal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the
time of the ￿scal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. This speci￿cation has
the advantage of being more compact and more convenient when estimating the regressions in the following
sections that include more variables on the right-hand side of equation (2). However, it constraints the change
of the left-hand side variable to be of the same magnitude from one period to the next. As expected, the
coef￿cient of FISCALis negative in ￿scal contractions and positive (except for the DISCR regression) in
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in ￿scal contractions and negative in ￿scal expansions when the share price index or its growth rate are on the
left-hand side of (2) (see Table 2).9
Overall, Tables 1 and 2 support the evidence in Figures 2 and 3 and indicate that country speci￿cc h a r a c -
teristics are not responsible for the negative (positive) correlation between changes in governments￿ primary
balance and interest rates (stock markets data). The next section investigates that this result is robust to
including additional variables on the right-hand side of equation (2).
4 Extensions and robustness
Results shown so far are robust to a variety of speci￿cation changes. In what follows, I extend the analysis
in section 3 to account for countries￿ initial ￿scal conditions, characteristics of ￿scal consolidations and ex-
pansions, macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and future ￿scal policy conditions. I, then,
summarize the results of additional robustness checks.
4.1 Countries￿ ￿scal position
The response of ￿nancial markets to ￿scal contractions and expansions can be different in countries with
low/high levels of government de￿cit or public debt. In fact, markets can react only when they perceive that
the change in ￿scal policy affects the likelihood of a default crisis, which, very likely, is correlated with the
level of the de￿cit or with the stock of public debt. To investigate this possibility, Tables 3 and 4 include
among the right-hand side variables of equation (2) the value of the government de￿cit-to-GDP ratio (DEF)
or of the public debt-to-GDP ratio (DEBT)a tt i m eT − 2 alone (Part I), or together with an interaction term
between DEF or DEBT and the variable FISCAL(Part II).
9See section 4.6 for speci￿cations that also control for time effects.
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this paper (see Part I of Tables 3 and 4).10 Instead, in Part II of Tables 3 and 4, we ￿nd an asymmetry
between episodes of ￿scal contractions and expansions. Speci￿cally, in the sample of ￿scal contractions
(Table 3, Part II), the coef￿cient of FISCALlooses signi￿cance in almost all regressions, but the coef￿cients
of FISCAL∗DEFand FISCAL∗DEBT arestatisticallysigni￿cant at least in oneofthetwospeci￿cations
and for the regressions of all variables except DISCR.
Consider a ￿scal consolidation that happens in a country with DEF or DEBT equal to the average
values in the sample of ￿scal contractions at T − 2 (4.7 and 60 per cent, respectively). INT10Y decreases,
on average, in each period, by 32 and 38 basis points. LIBORfalls by 36 and 39 basis points and CORP
by 15 and 29 basis points. If, instead, a ￿scal stabilization happens in a situation in which the de￿cit-to-GDP
ratio and the debt-to-GDP ratio are higher by one standard deviation, and are equal to 8.42 per cent and 85.96
per cent respectively, INT10Y falls by 55 and 56 basis points, LIBORb y5 5a n d6 3a n dCORPby 50 and
48 basis points. Hence, from T − 2t oT + 2, the decline in interest rates is quite sizeable, larger than 200
basis points.
Instead, in the sample of ￿scal expansions (see Part II of Table 4), the coef￿cients of the interaction terms
FISCAL∗ DEF and FISCAL∗ DEBT are not statistically signi￿cant at conventional critical values. This
suggests that the effect of ￿scal expansions on ￿nancial variables do not depend on countries￿ initial ￿scal
conditions. Hence, the speci￿cations in Table 2 and in Part I of Table 4 well capture the response of ￿nancial
variables around periods of large budget deteriorations.
In summary, results in Tables 3 and 4 seem to indicate that ￿nancial markets value episodes of ￿scal
adjustments, particularly when they happen in country-years with disrupted ￿scal conditions, but punish gov-
10Note that the coef￿cient of DEBT is negative and statistically signi￿cant in the regressions for interest rates and positive in those
for stock market prices. Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) and Caporale and Williams (2002) ￿nd the same result and explain it as
consequence of a liquidity effect.
Controlling for countries￿ initial ￿scal position does not alter the size and the statistical signi￿cance of
ernments that pursue large ￿scal expansions regardless of countries￿ initial ￿scal situations.
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Alesina and Perotti (1997), Ardagna (2004), Mc Dermott and Wescott (1996), among others, suggest that the
credibility of a ￿scal consolidation depends also on its composition. Fiscal contractions that are achieved by
cutting public spending more than by increasing tax rates are more likely to be long-lasting. Governments
that reduce transfers, government wages, public employment are perceived to be committed to solve the ￿scal
imbalance, because they undertake policy measures with more permanent effects on the budget. Moreover,
Alesina et al. (2002) show that pro￿ts increase in response to cuts of government spending, but decrease when
taxes increase. Following these arguments, we can expect a different reaction of ￿nancial markets to ￿scal
contractions (expansions) that sharply decrease (increase) government spending. Tables 5 and 6 estimate three
alternative speci￿cations of equation (2) to investigate whether this is the case.
First, in part I of Tables 5 and 6, I introduce among the regressors of equation (2), the change of the cycli-
cally adjusted primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio ( PREXP) or the change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted
transfers and government wage payments-to-GDP ( (TRANSF+ CGW)). Second, I de￿ne the following
dummy variables: (i) EXPLOW1 equal to 1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary
expenditure-to-GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of ￿scal contractions (￿s-
cal expansions) and zero otherwise; (ii) EXPHIGH1 equal to 1 − EXPLOW1; (iii) EXPLOW2 equal
to 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage payments-to-
GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of ￿scal contractions (￿scal expansions) and
zero otherwise; (iv) EXPHIGH2e q u a lt o1− EXPLOW2. I introduce among the regressors of equation
(2) EXPLOW1o rEXPLOW2i nP a r tI Io fT a b l e5a n dEXPHIGH1o rEXPHIGH2i nP a r tI Io fT a b l e
6. Third, in Part III of Tables 5 and 6, I estimate equation (2) not only adding among the regressors the dummy
v a r i a b l e sa si nP a r tI I ,b u ta l s oi n t eracting them with the variable FISCAL.
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 390
September 2004Let￿s begin by discussing the results in Part I and II. First, the qualitative nature of the results shown so
far holds. In fact, the coef￿cient of FISCAL is close to the one in Table 2. Second, when the estimated
coef￿cients are statistically signi￿cant, we observe a positive correlation between changes in government
spending and interest rates and a negative correlation between  PREXP or  (TRANSF+ CGW) and
MSCI or MSCIGR. Hence, sharper cuts (increases) to primary spending and to transfers and governments￿
wage bills are associated with lower (higher) interest rates and higher (lower) stock markets prices in periods
of ￿scal contractions (expansions). Finally, Part II suggests that ￿nancial markets are more concerned about
changes in transfers and the governments￿ wage bills than in the overall primary spending.
Let￿s now turn to the results in Part III. Consider, for example, results in Table 5, column 1 for the
speci￿cationthat includesthedummyvariable EXPLOW2. The10-yearnominalinterestrateofgovernment
bonds decreases, on average, in each period, by 55 basis points, for a total decrease, from T-2 to T+2, of about
220 basis points if the dummy variable EXPLOW2 is equal to 1. INT10Y, instead, falls only by 19
basis points per period, and by a total of 76 basis points, if transfers and the government wage bill change
by less than the median value in the sample. More importantly, while the t-statistics of the coef￿cient of
FISCAL ∗ EXPLOW2 is equal to -2.54, the one of FISCAL ∗ EXPHIGH2 is equal to 1.19. This
supports the evidence in previous studies that ￿scal adjustments implemented by heavily cutting transfers
and the government wage bill are associated with economic expansions. In fact, by decreasing interest rates
and stimulating the stock market, private consumption and private investment are more likely to increase and
compensate for the decrease in aggregate demand due to the fall in public spending.
Finally, around episodes of ￿scal expansions (Table 6), we observe evidence along the same lines when
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This section investigates the role played by macroeconomic conditions. I introduce on the right-hand side of
equation (2) the growth rate of real GDP (GROWTH)a n dt h ei n ￿ation rate (INFL)a tT −2a n dt h e i ry e a rl y
change to control both for the initial macroeconomic conditions and for the changes in the macroeconomic
fundamentals that happen from T − 2t oT + 2. Results are shown in Table 7. The coef￿cients of FISCAL
are close in size to the values in Table 2. Moreover, in the sample of ￿scal contractions, the coef￿cient of
FISCAL becomes statistically signi￿cant, at the 5% level in the regression for INT3M, and at the 10%
level in the regression for CORP, while it was insigni￿cant in Table 2. However, in the sample of ￿scal
expansions, the coef￿cient of FISCALbecomes insigni￿cant in the regressions for RINT3M and MSCI,
while it was signi￿cant at the 10% level in Table 2.
4.4 The policy mix
An alternative explanation for the decrease (increase) of interest rates and increase (decrease) of stock market
prices around episodes of ￿scal contractions (expansions) is that governments implement these changes in
￿scal policy with other economic measures that move ￿nancial variables in the observed directions. The
coef￿cient of FISCAL, hence, would not capture the effect of the large changes in the ￿scal stance but the
effect of omitted variables. To address this concern, I estimate equation (2) by adding among the regressors
variables that capture the extent of ￿nancial liberalization, international ￿nancial integration, exchange rate
movements and monetary policy.
First, I include on the right-hand side of (2) the initial values of the growth of the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate (EXCHGR), a measure of the extent of international integration of capital markets
(INT.INTEGR), a measure of ￿nancial liberalization (FIN.LIB), and the yearly change of these three
variables. The variable INT.INTEGRis an index constructed with data provided by Milesi-Ferretti and
following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). Speci￿cally, INT.INTEGRis a variable ranging from 0 to 4
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for all countries in the sample from 1966 to 1997 and it is equal to the sum of different dummy variables mea-
suring the existence of restrictions on the capital account, on the current account and the existence of multiple
exchange rates. The variable FIN.LIBis by Levine et al. (2000). It is equal to the ratio of commercial banks
assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. An higher value of this ratio implies a greater
degree of ￿nancial liberalization.
Second, I estimate equation (2) for INT10Y, RINT10Y, LIBOR, CORP, MSCI, MSCIGR by
including among the regressors the initial values of the discount rate or of the 3-month Treasury bills interest
rate and their yearly change to control for monetary policy.
Results in Table 8 suggest that restrictions on the current and capital accounts lead to higher interest rates
and that reforms that liberalize ￿nancial markets have the opposite effect. The coef￿cient of the growth of the
nominal exchange rate has, instead, opposite sign in the samples of ￿scal contractions and ￿scal expansions,
giving an ambiguous picture on the effect of devaluations/appreciations of the exchange rate.11 More impor-
tantly, the size and the signi￿cance of the coef￿cients of FISCAL are very close to their values in Table 2
i nt h es a m p l eo f￿scal contractions. However, results are weaker when we concentrate on the sample of ￿scal
expansions. Most likely, this is due to the loss of degree of freedom since the number of observations drops
almost by half relatively to the one in Table 2.
Finally, when I estimate equation (2) for INT10Y, RINT10Y, LIBOR, CORP, MSCI, MSCIGR
controlling for the initial values of the discount rate or of the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and for
their yearly change, results (not shown and available upon request) are very similar to those in Table 2. This
con￿rms that the evidence shown so far is not due to omitting variables measuring the stance of monetary
policy. Thisresultshouldcomeatnosurprisesincethecoef￿cientof FISCALis neverstatisticallysigni￿cant
in the discount rate equation and it is often insigni￿cant in the INT3M equation.
11Note that a minus sign of the coef￿cient of EXCHGRindicates a nominal devaluation.
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Consider a credible ￿scal contraction, that is one in which agents believe that the government is able to
generate a persistent decrease in public debt. As Alesina et al. (1992) show, in a model with two equilibria,
a credible ￿scal adjustment can move the economy from a ￿bad￿ equilibrium to a ￿good￿ one. In the bad
equilibrium, public debt is increasing and the default risk is rational since investors demand a risk premium.
Interest rates on government bonds increase making solvency more dif￿cult. In the good equilibrium, instead,
public debt falls, the risk premium decreases, interest rates are low and investors￿ con￿dence in governments￿
ability to honor debt is rational. Hence, a ￿scal adjustment that moves the economy from the bad to the good
equilibrium can generate a sharp decrease in interest rates. Similarly, a ￿scal expansion that is perceived to be
long lasting with dramatic effects on the stock of public debt can generate a strong increase in interest rates.
Tables 9 and 10 look at the path of public debt few years after the episodes of large changes in the ￿scal stance
and provide evidence in favor of Alesina et al. (1992).
In Part I of Tables 9 and 10, I introduce among the regressors of equation (2) the change of the public
debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the ￿scal contraction or ￿scal expansion to two ( DEBTT+2)o rt h r e e
( DEBTT+3)yearsafter. InPartII,IseparateepisodesusingthecriteriainMcDermottandWescott(1996)or
in Alesina and Perotti (1995). Speci￿cally, I de￿ne the following dummy variables: (i) DEBTLOW1 equal
to 1 if, two years after the last year of the ￿scal contraction (￿scal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-
GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; (ii) DEBTHIGH1
equal to 1 − DEBTLOW1; (iii) DEBTLOW2 equal to 1 if, three years after the last year of the ￿scal
contraction (￿scal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5
percentage points and zero otherwise; (iv) DEBTHIGH2 equal to 1 − DEBTLOW2. I introduce among
the regressors of equation (2) DEBTLOW1o rDEBTLOW2i nP a r tI Io fT a b l e9a n dDEBTHIGH1
or DEBTHIGH2 in Part II of Table 10. In Part III, I estimate equation (2) not only adding the dummy
v a r i a b l e sa si nP a r tI I ,b u ta l s oi n t eracting them with the variable FISCAL.
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 390
September 2004Overall, results support the theoretical prediction by Alesina et al. (1992) in the panel of ￿scal contrac-
tions (Table 9), but evidence is murkier in the panel of ￿scal expansions (Table 10). Financial markets seem
to react in anticipation of the future path of government debt-to-GDP ratio: the higher the decline in public
debt after ￿scal contractions, the lower the interest rates and the higher the stock market price index and its
growth rate. For example, a decline of the public debt-to-GDP ratio by one percentage point is associated
with an additional decrease of the 10-year government bonds interest rate of about 16 basis points (see Table
9, Part I). Interestingly, when I investigate if the effect of large changes of the government budget on ￿nancial
variables depends on the decrease of public debt in the future, I ￿nd that interest rates decrease and that the
stock market reacts positively only when governments are successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. In
fact, in Table 9, Part III, the coef￿cients of FISCAL∗ DEBTLOW1a n dFISCAL∗ DEBTLOW2a r e
statistically signi￿cant, but the coef￿cients of FISCAL∗ DEBTHIGH1a n dFISCAL∗ DEBTHIGH2
are not. However, this evidence is not con￿rmed in the sample of ￿scal expansions.
4.6 Additional robustness checks
This section summarizes the results of additional robustness checks. Results are not shown and are avail-
able upon request. First, I estimate equation (2) controlling for the time dimension. Figure 1 shows that the
distribution of ￿scal contractions and expansions over time is not uniform. Fiscal expansions are more fre-
quent in the seventies and in the most recent years, while ￿scal contractions are more common in the eighties
and nineties. Following this evidence, I de￿ne ￿ve dummy variables respectively equal to 1 in 1960-1969,
1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2002 and zero otherwise. I include them on the right-hand side of
(2). Results show that the size and signi￿cance of the coef￿cient of FISCALare not unduly sensitive to this
speci￿cation change. In the sample of ￿scal contractions, the coef￿cient of FISCAL in the regression of
RINT10Y is not signi￿cant and the one of LIBOR is signi￿cant only at the 10% level. In the sample of
￿scal expansions, instead, results are stronger than the ones in Table 2.
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expansions. Speci￿cally, episodes of large ￿scal contractions (expansions) are de￿ned as: (i) periods in which
the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1 per cent of GDP per year; (ii) periods
in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP per year.
The ￿rst less demanding rule identi￿es 118 years of ￿scal contractions and 97 periods of ￿scal expansions,
while there are 65 periods of ￿scal contractions and 55 episodes of ￿scal expansions according to de￿nition
(ii). When (i) is used, results are very close to those in Table 2 even though the size of the coef￿cients is
slightly smaller. When the tighter de￿nition is used changes in the stance of ￿scal policy have larger effects
on ￿nancial variables in periods of ￿scal contractions. In the sample of ￿scal expansions, however, the size
of the coef￿cients is, in general, smaller and the coef￿cients of INT10Y and RINT10Y are not statistically
signi￿cant.
Third, results are not sensitive to a particular country in the sample, In fact, dropping one country at a
time does not alter the estimates of equation (2).
Fourth, I check if results are sensitive to including in the samples a different number of years before or af-
ter the occurrence of ￿scal contractions/expansions. The qualitative nature of the results does not change if we
extend the window and include three periods before and after the occurrence of a ￿scal contraction/expansion,
or if we include observations from T − 2t oT + 1. Instead, if we include in the samples only observations
starting from T − 1, the coef￿cient of FISCALlooses signi￿cance in many regressions. However, its sign
is consistent with results in Table 2. I interpret this as evidence that ￿nancial markets anticipate the occur-
rence of ￿scal contractions and expansions. Hence, including in the samples only observations starting from
one year before does not allow us to fully capture the effect of the large swings in ￿scal policy on ￿nancial
variables.
Finally, I include among the regressors of equation (2) most of the variables that have been separately
added in sections 4.1-4.5. In particular, I estimate equation (2) controlling for: (i) countries￿ initial ￿scal
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￿scal consolidation/expansion by adding the change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and gov-
ernment wage payments-to-GDP ( (TRANSF+ CGW)), (iii) the macroeconomic situation by adding all
the variables in Table 6, (iv) the policy-mix by including all the variables in Table 7, (v) the change of the
public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the ￿scal contraction or ￿scal expansion to three years after
( DEBTT+3). Despite the sharp decrease in the number of observations and in the degrees of freedom, the
coef￿cient of FISCALin the sample of ￿scal contractions remains negative (positive) and statistically sig-
ni￿cant as in Table 2 when I estimate regressions for interest rates (MSCI index and its growth rate). The
size of the coef￿cients is also larger than in the benchmark model. In the sample of ￿scal expansions, results
are once again less strong.
5 Conclusions
This paper concentrates on episodes of large￿scal consolidations and expansions occurred in OECDcountries
from 1960 to 2002 and shows that ￿nancial markets value ￿scal discipline. Interest rates fall and stock
market prices increase around episodes of ￿scal consolidations; the opposite occurs around periods of ￿scal
expansions. Inaddition, thepapersuggeststhat￿nancialmarkets￿responsetolargechangesinthe￿scalstance
depends on countries￿ initial ￿scal positions and on the nature of ￿scal contractions. Fiscal adjustments that
occur in country-years with high levels of government de￿cit, that are implemented by cutting government
spending, andthatgenerateapermanentandsubstantialdecreaseingovernmentdebtareassociatedwithlarger
reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices. In the sample of ￿scal contractions, results
are robust to controlling for in￿ation, GDP growth and indicators of monetary and ￿nancial liberalization
policies. In the sample of ￿scal expansions, results are somewhat less robust to speci￿cation changes.
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Table 1: Financial markets, fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
  INT10Y INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
 Fiscal  Contractions 
TIMET-1   -0.0029 -0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0040 -0.0002 -0.0118 -0.0035 0.0705  0.0234 
  (-0.48) (-0.66) (-0.44) (-0.65) (-0.04) (-1.50) (-0.57) (0.43)  (0.57) 
TIMET  -0.0082 -0.0078 -0.0054 -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0144 -0.0068 0.2751  0.0878 
  (-1.61) (-1.21) (-1.29) (-0.85) (-0.97) (-2.10)** (-1.23)  (1.95)* (2.66)** 
TIMET+1  -0.0106 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0047 -0.0041 -0.0143 -0.0058 0.3571  0.0443 
  (-1.74)* (-1.15) (-1.64)* (-0.74)  (-0.59) (-1.81)* (-0.89) (2.23)** (1.16) 
TIMET+2  -0.0124 -0.0103 -0.0097 -0.0076 0.0016 -0.0194 -0.0063 0.4172 0.0323 
  (-2.05)** (-1.38)  (-1.94)*  (-1.20)  (0.23) (-2.43)** (-0.94) (2.61)** (0.79) 
Constant  0.1213 0.1145 0.1034 0.0960 0.1197 0.1130 0.1181 4.7753 0.0274 
  (17.10)** (11.03)** (16.53)** (10.86)** (11.32)** (6.95)** (13.92)**  (29.83)**  (0.58) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.34 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.44 0.10 
           
 Fiscal  Expansions 
TIMET-1   0.0057 0.0124 0.0051 0.0106 0.0029 0.0154 0.0086 -0.0251  -0.1576 
  (0.86) (1.54) (0.95) (1.58) (0.34) (1.56) (1.33) (-0.12)  (-3.36)** 
TIMET  0.0089 0.0088 0.0084 0.0112 -0.0036 0.0056 0.0140 -0.1048  -0.1796 
  (1.40) (1.23) (1.59)  (1.84)*  (-0.44) (0.66)  (2.20)**  (-0.54)  (-4.22)** 
TIMET+1  0.0122 0.0111 0.0102 0.0096 0.0021 0.0105 0.0146 -0.2614  -0.0974 
  (1.67)* (1.30) (1.68)* (1.39) (-0.23) (0.93) (1.83)*  (-1.21)  (-1.93)* 
TIMET+2  0.0162 0.0158 0.0142 0.0143 -0.0017 0.0110 0.0165 -0.3364  -0.1405 
  (2.37)** (1.92)* (2.47)**  (2.09)** (-0.21) (1.15)  (2.12)**  (-1.59)  (-2.93)** 
Constant  0.0923 0.0807 0.0755 0.0617 0.0997 0.0944 0.0919 5.0529 0.1258 
  (11.79)**  (6.80)** (9.24)** (5.09)** (8.11)** (5.18)** (9.57)**  (21.69)**  (2.62)** 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.29 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.14 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
TIMET-j are four dummy variables equal to 1 when j=-1,0,1,2 respectively and zero otherwise. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. 
Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
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 Table 2: Financial markets, fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
 Fiscal  Contractions 
FISCAL  -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0015 0.1119  0.0084 
  (-2.40)** (-1.44) (-2.27)** (-1.11)  (-0.12) (-2.33)** (-1.03) (3.15)**  (0.91) 
Constant  0.1240 0.1151 0.1059 0.0964 0.1177 0.1131 0.1178 4.6722 0.0481 
  (17.36)** (11.08)** (16.72)** (10.80)** (10.97)** (6.91)** (13.95)**  (29.16)**  (0.93) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.34 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.33 0.44 0.08 
           
 Fiscal  Expansions 
FISCAL  0.0039 0.0030 0.0034 0.0028 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0040 -0.0894  -0.0234 
  (2.51)** (1.64)* (2.60)** (1.82)*  (-0.24) (0.77)  (2.31)**  (-1.89)*  (-2.10)** 
Constant  0.0893 0.0810 0.0731 0.0626 0.1004 0.0970 0.0911 5.1824 0.0702 
  (11.10)**  (6.38)** (8.60)** (4.83)** (8.06)** (5.12)** (9.00)**  (22.43)**  (1.38) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.40 0.07 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. See 
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Table 3: The role of countries￿ initial fiscal position in periods of fiscal contractions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0036 -0.0015 0.1116 0.0117 
  (-2.31)** (-1.15) (-2.22)** (-0.81)  (0.08) (-2.08)** (-1.04) (3.11)** (1.28) 
DEFT-2  0.2401 0.3884 0.2796 0.3961 0.1862 0.1989 0.0324 5.2456 1.2250 
  (3.36)** (5.08)** (5.10)** (6.63)** (2.22)** (2.25)**  (0.33)  (2.52)** (2.80)** 
Constant  0.1111 0.0933 0.0910 0.0745 0.1072 0.1003 0.1162 4.4030 -0.0248 
  (13.85)** (8.44)** (13.17)** (7.91)**  (9.31)** (5.80)**  (11.60)**  (23.25)** (-0.43) 
N. of obs.  301 282 301 282 252 263 245 284 280 
R
2  0.36 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.34 0.45 0.11 
           
FISCAL  -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0041 -0.0028 0.1285  0.0151 
  (-2.80)** (-1.58) (-2.64)** (-1.18)  (-0.38) (-2.63)**  (-1.91)* (4.22)**  (1.57) 
DEBTT-2  -0.0594 -0.0476 -0.0401 -0.0283 -0.0426 -0.1031 -0.0534 2.9165  0.0373 
  (-4.93)** (-3.06)** (-4.10)** (-2.23)** (-2.79)** (-8.30)** (-4.25)** (13.82)**  (0.46) 
Constant  0.1116 0.0823 0.0993 0.0693 0.0724 0.1012 0.0922 4.5082 0.0190 
  (16.74)** (9.58)** (16.82)** (9.33)** (11.08)** (11.58)** (12.79)** (42.67)**  (0.39) 
N. of obs.  265 254 265 254 216 239 226 248 244 
R
2  0.40 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.55 0.43 0.68 0.11 
           
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0025 -0.0012 0.0029 0.0589 -0.0072 
  (-0.10) (0.34) (-0.48) (0.07) (1.14) (-0.45)  (1.68)* (0.98) (-0.50) 
FISCAL*DEFT-2  -0.0634 -0.0558 -0.0357 -0.0256 -0.0494 -0.0519 -0.0937 1.2106  0.4339 
  (-1.67)*  (-1.41) (-1.18) (-0.80) (-1.34) (-1.08)  (-2.44)**  (1.22) (1.69)* 
DEFT-2  0.4297 0.5596 0.3864 0.4747 0.3272 0.3569 0.3084 1.5343 -0.1082 
  (3.41)** (4.05)** (3.97)** (4.29)** (2.51)** (2.14)** (2.29)**  (0.41)  (-0.12) 
Constant  0.1026 0.0853 0.0862 0.0708 0.1005 0.0929 0.1032 4.5653 0.0336 
  (11.44)** (6.96)** (11.44)** (6.77)**  (8.21)** (5.10)**  (10.69)**  (18.90)**  (0.50) 
N. of obs.  301 282 301 282 252 263 245 284 280 
R
2  0.37 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.46 0.12 
           
FISCAL  0.0005 0.0040 0.0009 0.0047 0.0023 0.0021 0.0017 0.1217 0.0397 
  (0.16) (1.10) (0.36) (1.50) (0.67) (0.61) (0.53)  (1.84)*  (1.83)* 
FISCAL*DEBTT-2  -0.0071 -0.0109 -0.0066 -0.0105 -0.0050 -0.0098 -0.0076 0.0112 -0.0405 
  (-1.79)* (-2.17)** (-1.85)* (-2.37)**  (-1.05) (-2.02)**  (-1.81)*  (0.12)  (-1.25) 
DEBTT-2  -0.0383 -0.0154 -0.0207 0.0029 -0.0286 -0.0743 -0.0309 2.8826  0.1583 
  (-2.26)**  (-0.75) (-1.40) (0.17) (-1.54) (-4.26)**  (-1.74)* (8.60)**  (1.36) 
Constant  0.0988 0.0627 0.0875 0.0503 0.0647 0.0828 0.0789 4.5286 -0.0545 
  (9.81)** (5.22)** (9.95)** (4.81)** (6.34)** (7.31)** (7.38)**  (22.56)** (-0.75) 
N. of obs.  265 254 265 254 216 239 226 248 244 
R
2  0.41 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.55 0.44 0.68 0.11 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
DEFT-2 = government deficit-to-GDP ratio at time T-2; DEBTT-2 = public debt-to-GDP ratio at time T-2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal 
expansions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
In Part II, the magnitude of the change of financial variables around periods of fiscal contractions and expansions depends on the value of DEFT-2 or DEBTT-2. For 
exemplification purpose, consider the values in column (1), and assume that a fiscal consolidation happens in a country with DEFT-2 equal to its average value in the sample of 
fiscal contractions at T-2 (i.e.: 4.7 per cent). INT10Y decreases, on average in each period, by 32 basis points (i.e.: -0.0002 + (-0.0634)*(0.047) = -0.0032) 
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Table 4: The role of countries￿ initial fiscal position in periods of fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0031 0.0026 0.0029 0.0028 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0035 -0.0876  -0.0232 
  (2.23)** (1.51) (2.54)**  (1.97)** (-0.36) (0.06)  (2.15)**  (-1.85)*  (-2.05)** 
DEFT-2  0.5082 0.6611 0.4807 0.5975 0.5954 0.6327 0.4445 3.8505 0.2524 
  (6.57)** (6.54)** (7.89)** (7.56)** (6.09)** (4.18)** (4.58)**  (1.93)*  (0.36) 
Constant  0.0894 0.0794 0.0724 0.0600 0.0981 0.0998 0.0907 5.1593 0.0686 
  (11.40)**  (6.27)** (8.51)** (4.57)** (7.93)** (5.41)** (9.07)**  (22.12)**  (1.34) 
N. of obs.  211 196 211 196 179 175 172 211 209 
R
2  0.45 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.45 0.07 
           
FISCAL  0.0026 0.0021 0.0027 0.0024 -0.0005  -0.0012 0.0028 -0.0301 -0.0207 
  (1.67)* (1.11)  (1.97)**  (1.43) (-0.26) (-0.53) (1.57) (-0.95)  (-1.80)* 
DEBTT-2  -0.0597 -0.0536 -0.0283 -0.0221 -0.0121 -0.1210 -0.0454 4.1145 -0.0613 
  (-5.80)** (-3.32)** (-3.14)**  (-1.57)  (-0.57) (-6.74)**  (-3.58)**  (10.92)** (-0.75) 
Constant  0.1191 0.1111 0.0987 0.0901 0.1129 0.1454 0.1090 4.1657 0.1319 
  (10.73)** (5.72)** (10.53)** (5.30)**  (5.80)** (7.39)** (6.91)**  (24.46)**  (2.29)** 
N. of obs.  181 177 181 177 151 154 157 183 182 
R
2  0.44 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.43 0.47 0.39 0.82 0.09 
           
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0035 0.0029 0.0031 0.0028 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0039 -0.0973  -0.0252 
  (2.50)** (1.64)* (2.64)** (1.88)*  (-0.11) (0.46)  (2.36)**  (-1.79)*  (-2.33)** 
FISCAL*DEFT-2  -0.0316 -0.0221 -0.0169 -0.0029 -0.0294 -0.0536 -0.0260 0.7033  0.1422 
  (-0.87) (-0.47) (-0.56) (-0.08) (-0.70) (-1.14) (-0.61) (0.72)  (0.41) 
DEFT-2  0.6024 0.7279 0.5312 0.6064 0.6829 0.7925 0.5217 1.7544 -0.1717 
  (5.49)** (4.90)** (6.04)** (5.12)** (4.51)** (4.16)** (4.12)**  (0.47)  (-0.11) 
Constant  0.0881 0.0784 0.0716 0.0599 0.0968 0.0971 0.0893 5.1884 0.0745 
  (11.07)**  (6.12)** (8.32)** (4.51)** (7.82)** (5.18)** (8.83)**  (20.99)**  (1.47) 
N. of obs.  211 196 211 196 179 175 172 211 209 
R
2  0.46 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.45 0.07 
           
FISCAL  0.0021 0.0012 0.0031 0.0029 0.0015 -0.0051 0.0031 -0.0475 0.0086 
  (0.64) (0.23) (1.02) (0.61) (0.27) (-0.95) (0.62) (-0.45) (0.33) 
FISCAL*DEBTT-2  0.0010  0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0039 0.0072 -0.0005 0.0334 -0.0560 
  (0.15)  (0.18) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.36) (0.82) (-0.05) (0.16) (-1.01) 
DEBTT-2  -0.0623 -0.0583 -0.0260 -0.0193 -0.0008 -0.1410 -0.0441 4.0230  0.0928 
  (-3.24)**  (-1.95)*  (-1.48) (-0.70) (-0.02) (-4.74)** (-1.62) (5.90)**  (0.59) 
Constant  0.1205 0.1137 0.0975 0.0885 0.1071 0.1566 0.1083 4.2151 0.0486 
  (9.04)** (4.87)** (8.40)** (4.30)** (4.50)** (6.62)** (5.46)**  (12.84)**  (0.61) 
N. of obs.  181 177 181 177 151 154 157 183 182 
R
2  0.44 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.43 0.47 0.39 0.82 0.10 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
DEFT-2 = government deficit-to-GDP ratio at time T-2; DEBTT-2 = public debt-to-GDP ratio at time T-2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal 
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Table 5: The composition of fiscal contractions 
PART  I  INT10Y INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0036 -0.0015 0.1146 0.0124 
  (-2.17)** (-1.13) (-2.05)** (-0.83)  (0.33) (-2.07)** (-1.03) (3.25)** (1.38) 
∆PREXP  0.1001 0.1281 0.0144 0.0597 0.1822 0.1933 0.1628 -7.9723  -2.7765 
  (0.90) (0.92) (0.16) (0.52) (1.32) (1.19) (1.25)  (-2.59)**  (-3.29)** 
N. of obs.  304 285 304 285 255 266 245 287 283 
R
2  0.33 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.34 0.45 0.14 
           
FISCAL  -0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0036 -0.0015 0.1158 0.0120 
  (-2.17)** (-1.16) (-2.05)** (-0.85)  (0.34) (-2.14)** (-1.00) (3.30)** (1.32) 
∆(TRANSF+CGW)  0.5535 0.7561 0.3525 0.5669 0.6540 1.0072 0.4231  -16.8982  -2.6029 
  (2.94)** (3.35)** (2.21)** (2.88)** (3.20)** (4.25)** (1.96)** (-3.51)**  (-1.98)** 
N. of obs.  304 285 304 285 255 266 245 287 283 
R
2  0.35 0.38 0.33 0.37 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.46 0.11 
PART  II  INT10Y INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0015 0.1128  0.0084 
 (-2.40)**  (-1.44)  (-2.27)**  (-1.10)  (-0.12) (-2.35)** (-1.05) (3.21)**  (0.91) 
EXPLOW1  0.0033 0.0110 0.0025 0.0093 0.0032 0.0069 0.0049 0.2200 0.0014 
  (0.79) (2.24)** (0.71) (2.20)** (0.67)  (1.22)  (1.21) (1.86)* (0.05) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.45 0.08 
           
FISCAL  -0.0033 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0041 -0.0015 0.1120  0.0084 
 (-2.56)**  (-1.59)  (-2.41)**  (-1.24)  (-0.18) (-2.38)** (-1.00) (3.19)**  (0.91) 
EXPLOW2  -0.0248 -0.0295 -0.0197 -0.0242 -0.0326 -0.0282 -0.0141 0.3472 -0.0026 
  (-6.06)** (-5.43)** (-6.03)** (-5.39)** (-6.56)** (-4.91)** (-3.25)** (2.80)**  (-0.09) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.41 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.53 0.45 0.36 0.46 0.08 
PART  III  INT10Y INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL*EXPLOW1  -0.0039 -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0007 0.1138  0.0040 
  (-2.07)**  (-1.40) (-1.81)* (-1.20)  (-0.19) (-1.67)* (-0.31) (2.26)** (0.31) 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH1  -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0044 -0.0022 0.1117 0.0131 
  (-1.36) (-0.64) (-1.40) (-0.36) (0.03) (-1.64)* (-1.12)  (2.28)** (0.98) 
EXPLOW1  0.0070 0.0162 0.0043 0.0143 0.0046 0.0055 0.0002 0.2136 0.0290 
  (0.79) (1.50) (0.59) (1.57) (0.45) (0.47) (0.02) (0.87) (0.49) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.34 0.38 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.45 0.08 
           
FISCAL*EXPLOW2  -0.0055 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0036 0.1324  0.0245 
 (-2.54)**  (-1.42)  (-2.66)**  (-1.37)  (-0.23) (-2.18)** (-1.62) (2.15)** (1.76)* 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH2  -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0033 -0.0002 0.0989 -0.0017 
  (-1.19) (-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.42) (-0.04) (-1.36) (-0.13)  (2.35)**  (-0.13) 
EXPLOW2  -0.0138 -0.0221 -0.0090 -0.0162 -0.0310 -0.0227 -0.0040 0.2463 -0.0810 
  (-1.53) (-1.91)* (-1.21) (-1.69)*  (-2.98)** (-1.96)**  (-0.42)  (0.97)  (-1.29) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.42 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.53 0.45 0.36 0.46 0.08 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
∆PREXP = change of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP; ∆(TRANSF+CGW) = change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage 
payments to GDP; EXPLOW1 =  1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the 
sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; EXPHIGH1 = 1-EXPLOW1; EXPLOW2 = 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted 
transfers and government wage payments to GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; 
EXPHIGH2 = 1-EXPLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 6: The composition of fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0047 0.0040 0.0040 0.0034 0.0004 0.0024 0.0042 -0.1117  -0.0209 
  (3.04)** (2.10)** (3.02)** (2.09)**  (0.22) (1.06)  (2.32)**  (-2.30)**  (-2.04)** 
∆PREXP  0.1858 0.1416 0.0775 0.0549 0.0423 0.3973 0.2305  -12.6527  -4.2546 
  (1.31) (0.82) (0.64) (0.37) (0.26) (1.88)* (1.46)  (-3.42)**  (-4.72)** 
N. of obs.  220 205 220 205 188 182 179 217 215 
R
2  0.31 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.44 0.18 
           
FISCAL  0.0047 0.0040 0.0040 0.0034 0.0004 0.0022 0.0042 -0.1119  -0.0193 
  (3.06)** (2.10)** (3.01)** (2.10)**  (0.24) (1.01)  (2.30)**  (-2.34)**  (-1.84)* 
∆(TRANSF+CGW)  0.5448 0.5242 0.2195 0.2167 0.1521 1.2856 0.3844  -35.0060  -4.9416 
  (2.15)**  (1.71)*  (1.00) (0.82) (0.50) (3.17)** (1.35) (-5.66)**  (-2.79)** 
N. of obs.  220 205 220 205 188 182 179 217 215 
R
2  0.32 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.47 0.11 
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR   LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0039 0.0029 0.0034 0.0028 -0.0008 0.0014 0.0040 -0.0771  -0.0232 
 (2.51)**  (1.55)  (2.58)**  (1.77)*  (-0.41) (0.64)  (2.32)**  (-1.84)*  (-2.05)** 
EXPHIGH1  0.0166 0.0167 0.0090 0.0092 0.0259 0.0277 0.0138 -1.0527  -0.0164 
  (2.97)** (2.62)**  (1.92)*  (1.66)*  (3.78)** (3.63)** (2.40)** (-6.89)** (-0.45) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.32 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.53 0.07 
           
FISCAL  0.0035 0.0026 0.0032 0.0026 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0038 -0.0583  -0.0243 
 (2.29)**  (1.38)  (2.46)**  (1.69)*  (-0.31) (0.06)  (2.20)**  (-1.48)  (-2.17)** 
EXPHIGH2  0.0228 0.0206 0.0114 0.0088 0.0110 0.0508 0.0102 -1.4718 0.0387 
  (3.58)** (3.05)** (2.03)**  (1.49)  (1.26) (6.99)** (1.50)  (-10.30)** (0.92) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.33 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.28 0.60 0.07 
PART III  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR   LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL*EXPLOW1  0.0026 0.0000 0.0016 -0.0014  -0.0011 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0916 -0.0270 
 (1.09)  (0.01)  (0.83)  (-0.61)  (-0.36) (0.36) (0.30) (-1.28) (-1.44) 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH1  0.0046 0.0049 0.0044 0.0057 -0.0006 0.0015 0.0060 -0.0685  -0.0209 
  (2.31)** (2.02)** (2.55)** (2.76)**  (-0.25) (0.53)  (2.57)**  (-1.34) (-1.48) 
EXPHIGH1  0.0108 0.0029 0.0009 -0.0107 0.0246 0.0268 -0.0014 -1.1181 -0.0339 
 (1.01)  (0.24)  (0.10)  (-1.05)  (1.91)* (2.00)** (-0.13) (-3.60)** (-0.44) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.32 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.30 0.53 0.07 
           
FISCAL*EXPLOW2  0.0022 -0.0016 0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0027 0.0021 -0.0874 -0.0201 
  (1.03) (-0.61) (1.01) (-0.78) (-0.94) (-0.98) (0.83) (-1.71)*  (-1.15) 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH2  0.0050 0.0073 0.0048 0.0075 0.0016 0.0043 0.0057 -0.0245  -0.0291 
  (2.33)*  (2.83)** (2.60)** (3.41)**  (0.69) (1.36)  (2.46)**  (-0.40)  (-2.15)** 
EXPHIGH2  0.0148 -0.0047 0.0030 -0.0172 -0.0014 0.0304 -0.0001 -1.6500 0.0643 
 (1.39)  (-0.40)  (0.33)  (-1.72)*  (-0.10) (2.19)** (-0.01) (-6.00)** (0.85) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.33 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.39 0.29 0.60 0.07 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
∆PREXP = change of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP; ∆(TRANSF+CGW) = change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage 
payments to GDP; EXPLOW1 =  1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the 
sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; EXPHIGH1 = 1-EXPLOW1; EXPLOW2 = 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted 
transfers and government wage payments to GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; 
EXPHIGH2 = 1-EXPLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 7: Macroeconomic conditions around periods of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
 Fiscal  Contractions 
FISCAL  -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0044 -0.0020 0.1080  0.0093 
 (-3.27)**  (-2.01)**  (-2.75)**  (-1.42)  (-0.72) (-3.06)**  (-1.69)* (3.84)**  (1.02) 
GROWTHT-2  0.0370 0.2100 -0.0180 0.1562 0.2678 0.2000 0.3009 1.1465 -0.6260 
  (0.52) (2.21)** (-0.27) (1.75)*  (3.28)** (1.79)* (4.55)**  (0.55)  (-0.99) 
INFLT-2  0.4283 0.4422 0.2809 0.2869 0.5171 0.4523 0.4081  -10.6396  0.1361 
  (11.57)** (8.71)**  (8.21)**  (6.23)** (11.53)** (8.41)** (10.68)**  (-13.76)**  (0.53) 
∆ GROWTH  -0.0461 -0.1563 -0.0417 -0.1712 0.0044 -0.1887 -0.0766 0.6411 1.5639 
  (-0.74) (-1.96)** (-0.69) (-2.35)** (0.06) (-1.79)* (-1.09)  (0.47) (2.42)** 
∆ INFL  -0.0466 0.0092 -0.0837 -0.0972 0.0463 0.0454 -0.0895 0.6305 1.0412 
  (-0.55) (0.08) (-1.05) (-0.89) (0.48) (0.35) (-1.10) (0.39) (1.81)* 
Constant  0.0971 0.0819 0.0896 0.0740 0.0771 0.0910 0.0832 5.2854 0.0612 
  (14.03)** (8.99)** (12.55)** (8.64)**  (8.55)** (7.54)**  (12.48)**  (39.62)**  (1.02) 
N. of obs.  306 287 306 287 257 268 245 289 285 
R
2  0.64 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.69 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.11 
           
 Fiscal  Expansions 
FISCAL  0.0023 0.0013 0.0023 0.0015 -0.0007  -0.0018 0.0031 -0.0497 -0.0259 
 (2.26)**  (0.93)  (2.38)**  (1.17)  (-0.48)  (-1.12) (2.33)** (-1.45) (-2.32)** 
GROWTHT-2  -0.2129 -0.1608 -0.2940 -0.2308 -0.4929 0.0878 -0.3859 -7.4976 1.4629 
  (-3.06)**  (-1.54)  (-4.28)** (-2.40)** (-4.20)** (0.71) (-4.17)**  (-3.31)** (1.63) 
INFLT-2  0.5606 0.5868 0.3627 0.3807 0.5496 0.8116 0.5294  -18.5358  0.4220 
  (12.84)**  (10.42)**  (8.63)** (7.32)** (7.58)** (13.75)** (9.18)** (-13.69)**  (0.93) 
∆ GROWTH  -0.1054 -0.1838 -0.1047 -0.1896 -0.0947 -0.2484 -0.1526 -0.3873 1.8671 
  (-2.00)** (-2.37)** (-2.13)** (-2.79)**  (-1.18) (-2.50)**  (-2.50)** (-0.26) (3.02)** 
∆ INFL  0.0232 0.0920 -0.0684  -0.1113 0.1545 0.1465 0.0526 -5.7971 0.2365 
  (0.32) (1.06) (-1.07)  (-1.47) (1.53) (1.13) (0.59)  (-2.83)**  (0.38) 
Constant  0.0480 0.0352 0.0538 0.0391 0.0702 0.0353 0.0593 7.2605 -0.0317 
  (4.37)** (2.22)** (4.88)** (2.55)** (4.13)** (1.94)* (4.69)**  (35.58)** (-0.45) 
N. of obs.  226 213 226 213 196 185 184 223 220 
R
2  0.69 0.59 0.60 0.53 0.59 0.70 0.59 0.72 0.14 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
GROWTHT-2 = real GDP growth rate at T-2; INFLT-2 = inflation rate at time T-2; ∆GROWTH = change in real GDP growth rate; ∆INFL = change in inflation rate. See section 





Working Paper Series No. 390
September 2004 
Table 8: The policy-mix around periods of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI MSCIGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
 Fiscal  Contractions 
FISCAL  -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0049 -0.0016 0.1059  0.0236 
  (-2.47)**  (-1.17) (-1.61) (-0.31) (-0.88) (-2.98)** (-1.36) (3.73)** (2.08)** 
EXCHGRT-2  0.0236 0.0804 0.0834 0.1450 0.1661 -0.0321 0.0869 6.2845 0.2422 
  (0.46) (1.11)  (1.82)*  (2.25)**  (2.42)** (-0.42)  (1.58) (5.24)** (0.47) 
INT.INTEGR.T-2  0.0185 0.0156 0.0096 0.0070 0.0208 0.0335 0.0250 -0.6006 0.0013 
  (4.60)** (3.63)** (2.50)**  (1.75)*  (5.08)** (5.38)** (5.25)**  (-11.19)** (0.04) 
FIN.LIBT-2  -0.0632 -0.2119 -0.0858 -0.2207 -0.1464 -0.1370 0.0541 -4.3828 -0.6238 
  (-1.02) (-2.51)** (-1.56) (-2.76)**  (-2.16)** (-1.62)  (0.96) (-4.42)** (-1.63) 
∆EXCHGR  -0.0070 0.0002 -0.0062 0.0098 -0.0268 0.0114 -0.0238 0.9509 0.8514 
  (-0.30) (0.001) (-0.31)  (0.38)  (-0.89) (0.31) (-1.08)  (1.67)*  (3.74)** 
∆ INT.INTEGR  -0.0078 -0.0092 -0.0099 -0.0105 -0.0061 -0.0105 -0.0134 -0.0953 0.0517 
  (-0.83) (-1.49) (-1.13)  (-2.04)**  (-0.79)  (-1.08) (-2.30)** (-1.07)  (0.80) 
∆FIN.LIB  -0.0173 -0.1236 -0.0113 -0.0924 -0.0233 -0.1201 0.1167 -1.6348 0.4639 
  (-0.27) (-1.71)* (-0.20)  (-1.35)  (-0.33) (-1.98)** (1.42)  (-1.50)  (0.67) 
Constant  0.1620 0.2957 0.1750 0.2953 0.2389 0.2308 0.0442 9.6361 0.5898 
  (2.69)** (3.64)** (3.28)** (3.86)** (3.63)**  (2.77)** (0.80) (9.81)** (1.58) 
N. of obs.  202 197 202 197 196 172 156 194 193 
R
2  0.62 0.65 0.55 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.71 0.69 0.21 
           
 Fiscal  Expansions 
FISCAL  0.0019 0.0007 0.0028 0.0022 -0.0015  -0.0014 0.0019 0.0058 -0.0258 
 (1.46)  (0.38)  (2.22)**  (1.38)  (-0.81) (-0.63) (1.15)  (0.16)  (-2.01)** 
EXCHGRT-2  -0.2052 -0.2239 -0.2055 -0.1869 -0.1606 -0.0989 -0.1548 -3.0600 0.4778 
  (-2.68)** (-2.23)** (-3.04)** (-2.07)**  (-1.16) (-0.56) (-1.51) (-1.56) (0.70) 
INT.INTEGR T-2  0.0105 0.0002 0.0035 -0.0092 0.0090 0.0194 0.0131 -0.6666  -0.0045 
  (2.71)** (0.04)  (0.89) (-1.76)* (1.31) (2.00)**  (3.00)**  (-9.82)**  (-0.17) 
FIN.LIBT-2  -0.2158 -0.4823 -0.1756 -0.6242 -0.1788 -0.2054 -0.1888 1.1635  0.2988 
  (-7.70)** (-2.74)** (-5.67)** (-3.59)** (-2.63)** (-3.97)** (-4.59)**  (1.66)*  (1.11) 
∆EXCHGR  -0.0166 -0.0270 -0.0154 -0.0235 -0.0608 -0.0325 -0.0250 0.3579  0.8743 
  (-0.57) (-0.67) (-0.53) (-0.65) (-1.30) (-0.64) (-0.77) (0.47) (3.80)** 
∆ INT.INTEGR  -0.0060 -0.0036 -0.0100 -0.0040 -0.0089 -0.0064 -0.0069 -0.2682 0.0296 
  (-0.75) (-0.53) (-1.31) (-0.65) (-1.13) (-0.53) (-0.86)  (-2.32)**  (0.50) 
∆FIN.LIB  0.0313 0.0516 0.0432 0.0568 0.0247 -0.0507 0.1289 0.2280 1.2041 
  (0.76) (0.56) (1.07) (0.65) (0.27)  (0.96) (2.69)** (0.16)  (1.98) 
Constant  0.3169 0.5798 0.2633 0.6983 0.2860 0.3145 0.2866 4.6243 -0.2482 
  (9.55)** (3.37)** (7.66)** (4.10)** (3.88)** (4.97)** (5.88)** (5.91)**  (-0.80) 
N. of obs.  147 136 147 136 145 119 125 146 146 
R
2  0.69 0.66 0.59 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.61 0.71 0.24 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
EXCHGRT-2 = growth rate of the nominal effective exchange rate at T-2 (a minus sign indicates a nominal devaluation); INT.INTEGR T-2 = index measuring extent of 
international integration of capital markets, on the current account and the existence of multiple exchange rates at time T-2; .FIN.LIBT-2 = index measuring extent of financial 
liberalization at time T-2; ∆EXCHGR = change in EXCHGR; ∆ INT.INTEGR = change in INT.INTEGR; ∆FIN.LIB = change in FIN.LIB. See section 2.2 for the definition of 
fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions and section 3.5 for variables definitions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-
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Table 9: Fiscal contractions and debt sustainability 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0027 0.0227 0.0158 
  (-2.93)** (-1.44) (-2.80)** (-1.05)  (0.05) (-2.04)**  (-1.76)*  (3.55)** (1.72)* 
∆DEBT T+2  0.1644 0.1588 0.1249 0.1166 0.0936 0.1548 0.0484 -1.0052  -0.4682 
  (5.86)** (4.52)** (5.43)** (3.92)** (2.54)** (3.98)**  (1.11)  (-5.84)** (-1.87)* 
N. of obs.  270 263 270 263 225 241 227 253 249 
R
2  0.38 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.31 0.51 0.13 
           
FISCAL  -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0036 -0.0032 0.0268  0.0250 
  (-3.24)** (-1.41) (-3.04)** (-0.93)  (-0.31) (-2.09)**  (-2.17)**  (4.70)** (2.69)** 
∆DEBT T+3  0.1546 0.1546 0.1166 0.1136 0.1183 0.1729 0.1086 -0.9939  -0.3147 
  (8.83)** (7.16)** (7.74)** (5.91)** (4.94)** (7.15)** (3.70)** (-8.82)** (-1.69)* 
N. of obs.  255 248 255 248 223 226 219 238 234 
R
2  0.44 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.47 0.48 0.37 0.63 0.14 
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0036 -0.0026 0.0230 0.0159 
 (-2.84)**  (-1.39)  (-2.72)**  (1.03)  (0.15) (-2.01)**  (-1.74)*  (3.49)** (1.74)* 
DEBTLOW1  -0.0155 -0.0173 -0.0101 -0.0119 -0.0067 -0.0156 0.0009  0.1239  0.0177 
  (-2.91)** (-2.44)** (-2.27)**  (-1.95)*  (-0.95) (-1.64)* (0.16) (5.13)** (0.49) 
N. of obs.  270 263 270 263 225 241 227 253 249 
R
2  0.31 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.48 0.11 
           
FISCAL  -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0035 -0.0032 0.0268  0.0249 
 (-3.16)**  (-1.42)  (-2.98)**  (-0.94)  (-0.21) (-2.07)**  (-2.15)**  (4.53)** (2.69)** 
DEBTLOW2  -0.0300 -0.0298 -0.0207 -0.0199 -0.0278 -0.0460 -0.0218 0.1842  0.0339 
  (-6.01)** (-4.86)** (-4.92)** (-3.72)** (-3.84)** (-6.20)** (-3.54)** (8.93)**  (0.94) 
N. of obs.  255 248 255 248 223 226 219 238 234 
R
2  0.39 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.36 0.59 0.13 
PART III  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL*DEBTLOW1  -0.0062 -0.0020 -0.0054 -0.0019 0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0040 0.0282 -0.0124 
 (-2.47)**  (-0.61)  (-2.55)**  (-0.67)  (0.30) (-1.15) (-1.26)  (2.64)**  (-0.99) 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH1  -0.0027 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0000 -0.0038 -0.0021 0.0199  0.0333 
  (-1.62) (-1.31) (-1.40) (-0.77) (-0.02) (-1.66)* (-1.21) (2.37)**  (2.75)** 
DEBTLOW1  -0.0049 -0.0188 0.0004 -0.0097 -0.0093 -0.0170 0.0067  0.0990  0.1549 
  (-0.46) (-1.45) (0.05) (-0.88) (-0.78) (-1.19) (0.53) (2.01)**  (2.62)** 
N. of obs.  270 263 270 263 225 241 227 253 249 
R
2  0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.48 0.14 
           
FISCAL*DEBTLOW2  -0.0085 -0.0046 -0.0076 -0.0043 -0.0015 -0.0047 -0.0061 0.0342  0.0086 
 (-3.38)**  (-1.43)  (-3.56)**  (-1.50)  (-0.50) (-1.49)  (-2.24)**  (3.54)** (0.65) 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH2  -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0002  0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0019 0.0227 0.0339 
  (-1.34) (-0.60) (-0.93) (0.16)  (0.07) (-1.45) (-1.11)  (3.04)**  (2.79)** 
DEBTLOW2  -0.0108 -0.0194 -0.0016 -0.0063 -0.0231 -0.0404 -0.0092 0.1495  0.1098 
  (-1.12) (-1.61) (-0.19) (-0.60)  (-2.03)** (-3.40)**  (-0.86)  (3.56)**  (1.78)* 
N. of obs.  255 248 255 248 223 226 219 238 234 
R
2  0.40 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.37 0.59 0.14 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
∆DEBTT+2 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to two years after; ∆DEBTT+3 = change of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to three years after; DEBTLOW1 = 1 if, two years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal 
expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH1 = 1-DEBTLOW1; DEBTLOW2 = 1 
if, three years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5 percentage points and 
zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH2 = 1-DEBTLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 10: Fiscal expansions and debt sustainability 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0013 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0006  -0.0033 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0137 
  (0.90) (0.59) (1.31) (0.88) (-0.35) (-1.52) (1.07)  (0.10) (-1.14) 
∆DEBT T+2  0.1005 0.1131 0.0919 0.1035 0.1469 0.0955 0.0990 -0.4416  -0.2153 
  (3.80)** (3.50)** (3.96)** (3.60)** (4.51)** (1.74)* (3.13)**  (-2.38)** (-0.73) 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.50 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.60 0.09 
           
FISCAL  0.0013 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0006  -0.0033 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0138 
  (0.90) (0.60) (1.31) (0.88) (-0.36) (-1.52) (1.07)  (0.10) (-1.15) 
∆DEBT T+3  0.0743 0.0867 0.0703 0.0821 0.1253 0.0762 0.0695 -0.2278  -0.1555 
  (3.62)** (3.45)** (3.81)** (3.57)** (4.78)** (1.70)* (2.87)** (-1.64)* (-0.76) 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.50 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.35 0.59 0.09 
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL  0.0013 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0006  -0.0032 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0138 
  (0.90) (0.59) (1.32) (0.88) (-0.35) (-1.45) (1.07)  (0.10) (-1.15) 
DEBTHIGH1  0.0196 0.0215 0.0214 0.0235 0.0237 0.0152 0.0200 -0.0160  -0.0301 
  (4.34)** (3.59)** (5.41)** (4.25)** (3.62)** (1.45) (3.49)** (-0.42) (-0.60) 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.50 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.38 0.41 0.35 0.58 0.09 
           
FISCAL  0.0013 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0006  -0.0031 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0137 
  (0.89) (0.60) (1.30) (0.89) (-0.36) (-1.40) (1.07)  (0.10) (-1.15) 
DEBTHIGH2  0.0137 0.0222 0.0130 0.0214 0.0309 -0.0011 0.0144 0.0306 -0.0167 
  (2.51)** (3.28)** (3.03)** (3.89)** (4.43)** (0.11) (2.41)** (0.82)  (-0.36) 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.49 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.58 0.09 
PART III  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
FISCAL*DEBTLOW1  0.0034 0.0040 0.0018 0.0017 0.0034 0.0030 0.0064 0.0057 -0.0485 
  (1.45) (1.55) (0.91) (0.72) (1.29)  (0.74) (1.90)* (0.34) (-1.91)* 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH1  0.0005 -0.0002 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0025 -0.0054 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0014 
  (0.29) (-0.09) (1.02) (0.62) (1.04)  (-2.07)**  (0.17) (-0.17) (0.11) 
DEBTHIGH1  0.0282 0.0343 0.0223 0.0248 0.0413 0.0405 0.0381 0.0052 -0.1820 
  (3.25)** (3.02)** (2.85)** (2.29)** (3.69)** (2.67)** (3.17)**  (0.08)  (-1.90)* 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.50 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.36 0.58 0.11 
           
FISCAL*DEBTLOW2  0.0035 0.0032 0.0024 0.0018 0.0020 0.0029 0.0055 0.0037 -0.0405 
  (1.45) (1.17) (1.31) (0.79) (0.85)  (0.83) (1.82)* (0.24) (-1.75)* 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH2  0.0002 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0063 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0000 
  (0.10) (-0.07) (0.74) (0.55) (-0.93) (-2.32)** (0.05)  (-0.09)  (0.001) 
DEBTHIGH2  0.0236 0.0323 0.0165 0.0231 0.0438 0.0269 0.0307 0.0442 -0.1398 
 (2.62)**  (2.81)**  (2.27)*  (2.27)*  (3.95)** (1.86) (2.74)** (0.71)  (-1.60) 
N. of obs.  167 163 167 163 160 135 151 164 162 
R
2  0.49 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.35 0.58 0.11 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
∆DEBTT+2 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to two years after; ∆DEBTT+3 = change of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to three years after; DEBTLOW1 = 1 if, two years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal 
expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH1 = 1-DEBTLOW1; DEBTLOW2 = 1 
if, three years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5 percentage points and 
zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH2 = 1-DEBTLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 ￿ 9 estimated by OLS and standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
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  Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Episodes of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 




Australia  1979, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1994 
Austria  1977, 1984, 1986, 1997, 2001 
Belgium  1982, 1984, 1985, 1987 
Canada  1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 
Germany  1969, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1989, 2000 
Denmark  1976, 1977, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1999 
Spain  1972, 1973, 1986, 1987, 1996, 1997 
France 1996 
United Kingdom  1977, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 
Ireland  1982, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 
Italy  1967, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997 
Japan  1983, 1984, 2001 
Netherlands  1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996 
Sweden  1976, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 
USA  1968, 1969, 1976 
New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1993, 1994 




Australia  1975, 1990, 1991, 1992 
Austria 1975,  1993 
Belgium  1972, 1975, 1981, 1983 
Canada 1982 
Germany  1974, 1975, 1990, 2001 
Denmark  1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1982, 2002 
Spain  1971, 1981, 1982, 1993 
France  1975, 1981, 1992, 1993, 2002 
United Kingdom  1971, 1972, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 
Ireland  1978, 2001, 2002 
Italy  1965, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1981, 2001 
Japan 1993 
Netherlands  1975, 2001, 2002 
Sweden  1974, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2002 
USA  1975, 2001, 2002 
New Zealand  1988, 1997, 1998 
Notes: An episode of large fiscal contraction (expansion) is a period in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP or a 









Table A2: Summary statistics 
  Episodes of Fiscal Contractions 
        
 T-2  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
        
INT10Y  0.10  0.097 0.094 0.089 0.089 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
INT3M  0.091  0.086 0.087 0.084 0.083 
  (0.07)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
RINT10Y  0.085  0.083 0.082 0.077 0.077 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
RINT3M 0.077  0.073  0.074  0.0073  0.071 
  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
DISCR  0.084  0.084 0.079 0.080 0.086 
  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
LIBOR  0.10  0.088 0.087 0.086 0.083 
  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
CORP  0.097  0.094 0.093 0.093 0.092 
  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
MSCI 5.46  5.535  5.722  5.79  5.793 
  (0.145)  (0.143) (0.105) (0.139) (0.146) 
MSCIGR  0.047  0.070 0.135 0.088 0.076 
  (0.025)  (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) (0.032) 
  Episodes of Fiscal Expansions 
        
 T-2  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
        
INT10Y  0.087  0.093 0.096 0.101 0.106 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
INT3M  0.075  0.087 0.083 0.088 0.094 
  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
RINT10Y  0.072  0.077 0.081 0.083 0.088 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
RINT3M  0.058  0.069 0.069 0.070 0.076 
  (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
DISCR  0.083  0.086 0.079 0.086 0.083 
  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
LIBOR  0.085  0.101 0.091 0.098 0.100 
  (0.007)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) 
CORP  0.089  0.097 0.103 0.105 0.107 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
MSCI 5.708  5.683  5.655  5.40  5.345 
  (0.186)  (0.185) (0.137) (0.197) (0.199) 
MSCIGR  0.134  -0.025 -0.042 0.037 -0.004 
  (0.035)  (0.032) (0.023) (0.038) (0.031) 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate. 
Standard deviation of the means in parenthesis. 
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